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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
Case No. 990583-CA

v.

:

DENNIS CRAIG SMITH,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from two convictions for theft, one a second degree felony and
the other a third degree felony, and one conviction for attempted theft, a class A
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(e)
(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Was there sufficient evidence concerning the value of the videotapes stolen
on April 10, 1998, to support defendant's conviction on Count II for theft of
property worth at least $1,000?
A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence and

all reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or
she] was convicted." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997).

II.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's restitution order of
$34,755 where the evidence showed that defendant stole 993 videotapes
valued at $35 each?
This Court reverses a restitution order for insufficient evidence only if "'the clear

weight of [the] evidence contradicts the trial court's [ruling].'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d
539, 541 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995))
(second set of brackets added).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1998);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by amended information with two counts of second degree
felony theft of property with a value of or exceeding $5,000, and one count of attempted
theft of property with a value of or exceeding $1,000, a class A misdemeanor (R. 1-3).
After a two-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree felony theft on the
first count; the lesser-included offense of third degree felony theft on the second count;
and attempted theft as charged on the. third count (R. 65-67; R. 101:45-46).
In a final judgment entered May 27,1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to
one-to-fifteen years on the second degree felony; zero-to-five years on the third degree
felony; and 365 days in jail on the class A misdemeanor (R. 79). Execution of these
sentences was stayed, and defendant was ordered to serve 120 days in jail and three years'
2

probation (R. 79; R. 102:10). An initial restitution hearing was set for July 6, 1999 (R.
79; R. 102:10).
On June 24, 1999, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court's
May 27, 1999 order (R. 91-92).
On August 17, 1999, the trial court held a restitution hearing and ordered that
defendant pay restitution in the amount of $34,755 (R. 95; R. 103:32). However, the trial
court has yet to issue a final restitution order. Defendant has filed no new notice of
appeal since the trial court announced its restitution ruling.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the year and a half that defendant worked at Sight and Sound, a videotape
wholesaler, the business sustained some $800,000 in lost inventory (R. 98:140-41).
During his first six months there, defendant pawned 893 new videotapes at pawn shops
across Salt Lake County (R. 100:134). He was later caught on two occasions stealing or
attempting to steal cases of new videotapes from the company's dock area (R. 98:120-26;
R. 100:42-54, 58).
Sight and Sound is "a wholesale distribution company for home videos" (R.
98:82). It distributes home movies to retailers such as Albertsons, Smith's, and
Blockbuster and handles some $45 million in videos annually (R. 98:82-84).
Before defendant began working at Sight and Sound, the company would conduct
a manual inventory count almost every quarter (R. 98:134). At that time, the warehouse
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would close for a few days, manually count all of its inventory, compare those numbers to
the inventory recorded on the computer, and make any adjustments necessary to balance
those figures (R. 98:84). Any overages in the manual counts were generally caused when
movies previously thought to be lost—and which, therefore, had been deducted from the
computer inventory—were found during the manual inventory check (R. 98:139).
An inventory check completed in July 1996 showed a net overage of over $30,000
of product (R. 98:138). An inventory check completed September 1996 showed a net
overage of over $5,000 of product (R. 98:139). Because of the rush associated with
Christmas, no inventory check was completed in December 1996 (R. 98:139-40).
During this time, Renn Monson was employed as an assistant warehouse manager
with the company (R. 98:87). He also held the cleaning contract for the warehouse (R.
98:87). Defendant began helping Monson with the cleaning in January 1997 (R. 100:138,
157). He was hired by Sight and Sound as a warehouse worker on June 16, 1997 (R.
98:86).
The first manual inventory conducted after defendant had been hired as a cleaner
showed a deficit of $79,000 worth of product (R. 98:140). The next, in July 1997,
showed a deficit of $53,000 (R. 98:140). The December 1997 check showed a deficit of
$412,000 (R. 98:140). The February 1998 check showed a deficit of $208,000 (R.
98:140). The April 5,1998, check showed a deficit of $42,000 (R. 98:140).

4

On January 7, 1997, defendant pawned 134 videotapes at Premier Pawn in Salt
Lake City (St. Exh. 19, admitted at R. 100:259). The next day, he pawned fifty tapes at
Witzels (Id.). On January 28, 1997, defendant pawned sixty-six videos at three different
pawn shops in a space of about thirty minutes (Id.). The next day, he pawned
nineteen videos at a fourth pawn shop (Id.). On February 15, 1997, he pawned twentyfive at yet another (Id.). On February 21, 1997, defendant pawned 149 videos at three
different pawn shops (Id.). On February 22, 1997, he pawned 199 videos at three other
pawn shops (Id.). Finally, on four different days between March 1 and June 25, 1997,
defendant pawned 251 videos at Hy & Mike's. (St. Exh. 15; R. 100:99-102).
Thus, between January 7, 1997 and June 25,1997, defendant pawned a total of 893
videos at various pawn shops across Salt Lake County (Id.). Most of the pawned movies
were "brand new," still "in the wrapper" (R. 100:99-102). Titles included Jurassic Park,
Heat, and Casino, sometimes up to fifteen copies each (R. 100:102-03).
At the beginning of April 1998, Sight and Sound hired Richard Forbes, a private
investigator, to investigate possible theft at the company (R. 98:117). On April 10, 1998,
Forbes positioned his car to conduct surveillance of the warehouse after the employees
had gone home (R. 100:42). At approximately 6:30 p.m. that night, Forbes saw defendant
enter the premises and park his four-door gold Plymouth outside the six-foot high fence
that surrounded Sight and Sound's docking area (R. 98:116; 100:44-47). Shortly
thereafter, two passengers exited the car (R. 100:46). One scaled the fence, went directly
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to the docking ramp, pulled out a case of videotapes, carried it to the fence, and threw it
over to the other passenger waiting outside the fence, who then placed the box on the
back seat of defendant's car (R. 100:47). The process was repeated with a second box,
after which the first passenger re-scaled the fence, both passengers re-entered the car, and
the car left (R. 100:47). Forbes recorded the whole event on a hand-held video recorder
(R. 48-53).
Based on Forbes' April 10 surveillance and without informing its employees, Sight
and Sound installed surveillance cameras on the inside and outside of the building to
record any suspicious conduct taking place in the docking area (R. 100:53).
On April 14, 1998, Forbes again positioned his vehicle to conduct after-hours
surveillance of Sight and Sound's docking area (R. 100:54). At approximately 5:40 p.m.,
after almost all the employees had left, Forbes observed defendant carry a case of
videotapes out of the warehouse, place it underneath the ramp in the docking area, and
then go back into the warehouse (R. 100:54, 243). After notifying the local police,
Forbes walked over to the ramp, looked at the case, and recorded the case's serial number
(R. 100:54-55, 57). The case appeared unopened and sealed with its original tape (R.
100:57).
At approximately 8:00 p.m. that night, defendant, alone this time, returned to the
docking area in his gold Plymouth, parked his car near the dock, exited the car, and
approached the steps of the dock (R. 100:60, 243). However, before defendant could
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climb over the gate, Murray City police officers stopped and questioned him (R. 100:60).
Defendant told the officers that he was merely an employee of the company checking
things out after hours (R. 100:88). He was released once the officers established that he
did not have any videotapes in his possession at the time (R. 100:89). The events were
recorded on Sight and Sound's surveillance cameras (R. 98:122-26).
The next morning, defendant arrived to work at 8:00 a.m., two hours prior to the
beginning of his shift (R. 98:160, 168). It was unusual for him to be there that early (R.
98:168). However, as defendant himself testified, he wanted to retrieve the box from
under the ramp before anyone else saw it (R. 100:250). Sight and Sound's surveillance
cameras recorded defendant retrieving the box (which had gotten wet overnight),
covering it with plastic, and returning it to the warehouse (R. 98:126-131).
The box was later seized by Sight and Sound officials (R. 98:144). It contained
fifty new "L.A. Confidential" tapes with a retail value of approximately $100 each (R.
98:146,186).
While defendant was working as a janitor only (before he was hired on June 16,
1997), he had no authority to take any videos from the premises of Sight and Sound (R.
98:86). After June 16, 1997, he had permission, just like any other employee, only to take
screeners returned to the warehouse by Sight and Sound salespersons (R. 98:99).l No

1

"Screeners" are videotapes provided to Sight and Sound salespeople free of
charge so that they can preview the products they will be selling (R. 98:88-93; R. 100:31).
Salespeople may keep any of the screeners they receive (R. 98:99-100). Screeners they
7

employee was allowed to take new or defective tapes from the warehouse (R. 98:88, 115,
179). Generally, defective tapes were either returned to the manufacturer for a full refund
or were sold to a company on the east coast for parts (R. 98:95-97, 100-02, 108; R.
100:153). Thus, defective tapes were as valuable to Sight and Sound as were nondefective tapes (R. 98:96-97).
Sight and Sound officials and Forbes confronted defendant on April 15, 1998 (R.
100:162). At that time, defendant admitted that he had been taking "cases of video tapes"
from the company for several months (R. 100:64). However, defendant insisted that he
had taken only damaged tapes which he would repair at home (R. 100:80). At trial,
defendant testified that the boxes he had taken on April 10 and 14 were boxes of
screeners and defective tapes that were actually given to him a few days earlier by a
supervisor (R. 100:209-10, 237-38).2
On approximately April 17, defendant was interviewed by Detective Jeff Anderson
(R. 100:116). Defendant initially denied that he had pawned any videos (R. 100:116). He
also contended that the videos taken on April 10 were defective tapes of no value (R.
100:113, 139). He later admitted that he had in fact pawned at least 893 Sight and Sound
don't want, however, are either placed in a common area for employees to take or placed
in the company's library for employee checkout (R. 98:99-100). Sight and Sound
receives, on average, 120 to 130 screeners per month (R. 98:100). Because they are free
to the company and are not meant to be sold, no inventory is kept for screeners (R.
98:114).
2

The supervisor testified on defendant's behalf at trial but did not corroborate his
story (R. 98:150-89).
8

tapes at local pawn shops, but claimed that all those tapes had been defective (R. 100:134,
147). A subsequent search of defendant's home and storage unit revealed fourteen brand
new copies of the movie, Touch, that had been taken from Sight and Sound (R. 100:141).
Defendant stopped working for Sight and Sound on April 15, 1998 (R. 100:25).
The inventory check covering the period from April 6, 1998 to June 30, 1998, showed a
deficit of $6,000 worth of product (R. 98:141). The next check, conducted at the end of
September 1998, showed a surplus of $25,000 (R. 98:141). The one conducted in January
1999 showed a surplus of $10,000 (R. 98:141).
Sight and Sound paid anywhere from $10 to $80 for each of its videos, depending
on the type of movie involved (R. 100:151, 153). Thus, the average cost of a video was
between $35 and $40 (R. 100:150). However, most of the videos lost by Sight and Sound
between January 1997 and June 1998 were new, higher-priced releases (R. 100:27, 15253).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial—that defendant stole 100 videotapes on April 10,
1998, each costing Sight and Sound an average of $35—is sufficient to support
defendant's conviction on count II for stealing property worth at least $1,000.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's restitution claim because no
final restitution order has yet been entered, and because defendant has yet to file a timely
notice of appeal concerning the trial court's ruling. Alternatively, this Court should
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refuse to consider defendant's claim because he did not preserve it below and because he
has failed to marshal the evidence on appeal. In any case, the undisputed evidence
presented at defendant's restitution hearing supports the trial court's order.
ARGUMENT
I.

EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT STOLE 100 VIDEOTAPES
WHOSE AVERAGE VALUE WAS $35 EACH IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT ON
COUNT II.
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of third

degree felony theft on count II because "the State failed to prove what was contained in
the two boxes" stolen by defendant on April 10, 1998. Aplt. Br. at 13-14.3 Thus, on
appeal, defendant does not dispute that he stole two videotape boxes from Sight and
Sound on April 10,1998. Rather, he asserts that the State failed to present any evidence
from which to conclude that those boxes contained videotapes worth at least $1000. See
Aplt. Br. at 13-14.
A.

This Court should not reach defendant's claim because he failed to
preserve it below.

As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule "applies

3

Section 76-6-412 of the Utah Code provides that a person convicted of theft of
property with a value of that "is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000" is guilty of a
third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b) (Supp. 1998).
10

to every claim, including [sufficiency claims], unless a defendant can demonstrate that
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. atffl[l1, 14.
In this case, defendant did not raise his insufficient evidence claim below.
Furthermore, he does not argue "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal.
Consequently, this Court should not reach his claim. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (rejecting defendant's claim that State was required to establish
certain mens rea at preliminary hearing where defendant did not raise the claim below:
"Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies
a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal.")
B.

This Court should not reach defendant's claim because he has not
provided an adequate record.

"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the appellant has the burden of providing the reviewing
court with an adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations." Call v. City of West
Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198,
201 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982).
Absent an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court will necessarily assume the
regularity of the proceedings below. See Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah
1989); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995).
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Here, a number of surveillance tapes that recorded the April 10 theft and the April
14 attempted theft were admitted into evidence at trial (St. Exh. 7-10; R. 98:120-32;
R. 100:48-53). A statement regarding his involvement written by defendant on April 15,
1998, was also admitted (St. Exh. 14; R. 67-68). However, defendant has not included
any of these exhibits in his record on appeal. Without them, the record is inadequate to
review defendant's sufficiency claim, and this Court should refuse to consider it.
C.

Defendant's claim fails on the merits.

Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction for theft. See
State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d
337, 344 (Utah 1997); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986); State v. Watts,
675 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1983).
Furthermore, "the mere existence of conflicting evidence . . . does not warrant
reversal." State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). "The jury, not the
appellate court, weighs the evidence and assesses witness credibility; so long as some
evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them."
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985)).
Thus, a jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, are "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
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must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he [or she] was convicted." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); see
also State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1991). The same standard
applies to a jury's property value determination. Zellers v. United States, 682 A.2d 1118,
1121 (D.C. App. 1996) (holding jury's determination concerning the value of stolen
property will be overturned only if "the jury's verdict was based on surmise or
conjecture"); United States v. Thweatt, 433 F.2d 1226, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Here, the evidence presented to the jury, and the reasonable inferences therefrom,
support the conclusion that defendant stole over $1000 in videotapes from Sight and
Sound on April 10, 1998.
Defendant stole 100 videotapes on April 10. First, defendant admits that each of
the boxes taken by him and his accomplices on April 10, 1998, was designed to hold fifty
videotapes (R. 100:211, 214). Second, the accomplice retrieving the boxes from the ramp
retrieved them one at a time (R. 100:42, 45, 47). From these facts, the jury could
reasonably infer that the boxes were too full and heavy to easily carry together.
Third, defendant testified that both the April 10 and the April 15 boxes contained
videotapes that his supervisor had given him a few days earlier (R. 100:209, 237-38).
Defendant explained that he received all those tapes at the same time and that they were
either screeners or defective tapes (R. 100:209,237-38). From this, the jury could
reasonably infer that the boxes taken on April 10 contained the same types of videos
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contained in the box defendant tried to take on April 14. However, when examined, the
April 14 box did not contain screeners or defective videos but rather, contained fifty new
L.A. Confidential videotapes (R. 98:146, 186). From this, the jury could reasonably
conclude that the April 10 boxes contained similarly valuable videotapes.
Fourth, on April 15, defendant admitted that he had been taking "cases of video
tapes" from the company for several months (R. 100:64). Because defendant's
confession came right after Sight and Sound officials confronted him with the full box of
L.A. Confidential tapes, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was admitting
to having previously taken similarly full boxes.
Finally, between April 5, 1998 and June 30, 1998, Sight and Sound registered a
loss of $6,000 in inventory (R. 98:141). If the average cost of Sight and Sound's
videotapes was $35, as Sight and Sound's sales manager testified (R. 100:150), that loss
amounted to a loss of approximately 171 videotapes. Yet, Sight and Sound surveillance
cameras, which remained in place for several weeks after April 14, recorded no other
completed thefts (R. 100:26-27). From this, the jury could reasonably conclude that the
majority of those tapes were in the boxes taken on April 10.
This evidence is sufficient to conclude that defendant stole 100 videotapes on
April 10, 1998.
The value of those tapes exceeded $1000. When establishing the value of stolen
property, the test to be applied is "the market value t e s t . . . . That value is the highest
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price, estimated in terms of money, for which the property would have sold in the open
market at [the] time [of the crime] and in that locality." State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811,813
(Utah 1977); see also State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518. (Utah 1980); State v. White,
152 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah 1944); State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah App.1988).
However, the purchase price of the property—that amount paid by the victim—"'is
competent evidence of fair market value .. . where the goods are so new, and thus, have
depreciated in value so insubstantially, as to allow a reasonable inference that the
purchase price is comparable to the fair market value.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278,
283 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting People v. Paris, 511 P.2d 893, 894 (Colo. 1973) (en
banc)).
Here, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support the
conclusion that the videos stolen on April 10 were worth at least $1000. First, as
discussed above, Sight and Sound registered a loss of $6000 in inventory between the
dates of April 5 and June 30, 1998 (R. 98:141). However, neither the private
investigator's surveillance nor the surveillance cameras installed after defendant stole the
two cases of videotapes on April 10 revealed any other thefts during that period (R.
100:26-27, 83). From this, the jury could reasonably conclude that the boxes defendant
stole on April 10 were the sole cause of Sight and Sound's loss. This evidence alone is
sufficient to support the jury's verdict that the videos defendant stole on April 10 were
worth at least $1000. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1 )(b).
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In addition, however, the State also presented evidence both that most of Sight and
Sound's missing inventory consisted of new and high-priced videotapes and that these
were the types of videos defendant stole, despite his claim that he took only screeners and
defective tapes (R. 100:27). First, defendant's own witness, on cross-examination,
admitted that no employee ever took fifty screeners home in one day (R. 98:171). In
addition, numerous witnesses testified that defendant had no authority to take home
defective tapes (R. 98:88, 115-16, 179).
Moreover, of the 893 videotapes that defendant pawned from January 1997
through June 1997, some ninety-five percent of those were new releases, including highpriced releases such as Jurassic Park, Heat, and Casino, sometimes up to fifteen copies
of each title, still in their plastic sheathing (R. 100:102-03).
Further, on April 14, defendant was caught on surveillance cameras attempting to
steal another box of Sight and Sound videotapes (R. 98:144). He took a box out of the
warehouse and placed it under the ramp (R. 98:121-26). After having been stopped by
police when he tried to retrieve the box later that night, defendant arrived at work early
the next morning to return the box to the warehouse (R. 98:127-32). Defendant claimed
that this box and the April 10 boxes were full of only screeners and defective tapes (R.
100:209, 237-38). However, the box defendant returned on April 15 was actually a full
box of brand-new videotapes (R. 98:144). A jury could reasonably infer that, having lied
about the April 15 box, defendant was also lying when he claimed the April 10 boxes
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contained only screeners and defective tapes. It could further conclude that the Apnl 10
boxes in fact contained new tapes. The fact that approximately fourteen new Sight and
Sound copies of the movie, Touch, were subsequently found in defendant's apartment and
storage unit lends further support to the jury's conclusions (R. 100:141).
Moreover, even if defendant had successfully stolen defective tapes against
company policy, those tapes were as valuable to Sight and Sound as were the nondefective ones (R. 98:96-9). Thus, even if the April 10 boxes did contain only defective
tapes, the value of those tapes would be the same as if he had stolen new ones.
Finally, the State presented evidence that the price Sight and Sound paid for its
videos ranged from $10 to $70, with the average cost about $35 to $40 (R. 100:150). One
hundred videotapes at a cost of $35 each would be worth $3,500.
All this evidence supports the jury's conclusion that defendant stole over $1000
worth of property on April 10. This is not a case, then, where the jury "had no basis upon
which to conclude that the value of the equipment on the date of theft equaled or
exceeded $1000." Lyman, 966 P.2d at 284 (finding evidence insufficient where
equipment was several years old and "[t]he State presented no evidence concerning the
condition of the equipment at the time of the theft or the rate at which the equipment
would depreciate").
Consequently, defendant's insufficiency claim fails.
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II.

EVEN IF DEFENDANT'S RESTITUTION CLAIM WERE
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, WHICH IT IS NOT, THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER.
Defendant asserts that "the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the

trial court's Order of Restitution." Aplt. Br. at 15. Specifically, defendant asserts that
each figure upon which the trial court relied—the number of tapes defendant pawned
(893), the number of tapes contained in the two boxes taken on April 10 (100), and the
average value of the tapes distributed by Sight and Sound ($35)—"is entirely unsupported
by any evidence." Aplt. Br. at 16.
A.

This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's
claim because no final restitution order has been entered
and no proper notice of appeal has been filed.

An unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. State v.
Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997); Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d
650, 653 (Utah 1994). "Absent a final order, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction and
must dismiss the appeal" Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App. 153 f 5, 981 P.2d 417; see
also Jiminez, 938 P.2d at 264; Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc., 882 P.2d at 553.
In Issue B of his opening brief, defendant challenges a restitution order noted
only in an unsigned minute entry (R. 95). See Aplt. Br. at 15-17. No formal, written,
or signed restitution order has yet been entered. Hence, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider defendant's claim at this time. Cf. State v. Davis, 721 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah
1986) (per curiam) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to consider restitution claims
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where "[t]he only record of [the restitution] proceeding is an unsigned minute entry
which is not appealable").
Moreover, even if a final order existed, this Court still lacks jurisdiction over
defendant's claim because he has not yet filed a proper notice of appeal under Rule 4,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 4(a) provides that, "[i]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter
of r i g h t . . . , the notice of appeal... shall be filed . . . within 30 days after the entry of
the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Rule 4(c) then provides
that "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule [inapplicable here], a notice of
appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgement, or order but before the
entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry
and on the day thereof." Utah R. App. P. 4(c).
In this case, defendant's notice of appeal was not filed after the trial court
announced its restitution ruling or "within 30 days after the entry of the [restitution]
order appealed from," since no such order has yet been entered. Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
Thus, under rule 4, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim.
B.

This Court should decline to reach defendant's claim
because he failed to preserve it below.

"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule "applies
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to every claim, including [sufficiency claims], unless a defendant can demonstrate that
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at ffl|l 1, 14.
In this case, defendant did not raise his insufficient evidence claim below.
Furthermore, he does not claim "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal.
Consequently, this Court should not reach his claim. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ("Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances'
or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal.")
C.

The evidence supports the trial court's findings that
defendant stole a total of 993 videotapes from Sight and
Sound and that the average cost of each videotape was
$35.

"To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence [supporting the trial
court's restitution order], appellant 'must demonstrate that the clear weight of [the]
evidence contradicts the trial court's verdict.'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah
App. 1997) (quoting State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995)) (first set of
brackets added). However, because defendant did not raise this claim below, he can raise
it here only for plain error. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 17. To succeed on his claim, then,
defendant must show that "the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental" that
the trial court should have found it sua sponte. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 18. Moreover,
defendant cannot assert plain error if he himself led the trial court into making that error.
See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,131, 12 P.3d 92.
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Section 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) provides that "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages,... the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crimes." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998).
Section 76-3-201(1 )(c) defines "pecuniary damages" as "all special damages . . which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities." Id. § 76-3-201(10(c). Under
these provisions, the State need only establish the amount of restitution by a
preponderance of the evidence. Cf. State v. Houston, 2000 UT App 242, f 12, 9 P.3d 188
("An award of pecuniary damages as restitution for crime is justified because proof of a
defendant's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily meets the preponderance of the
evidence standard establishing civil liability."). Here, the evidence was sufficient to meet
that burden.
As the trial court noted during defendant's restitution hearing, the trial court based
its restitution order not only on the evidence provided at defendant's restitution hearing,
but also on the evidence presented during defendant's trial (R. 103:28).
At trial, the State presented evidence that defendant had pawned 893 Sight and
Sound videos at pawn shops across Salt Lake County within six months of beginning to
work at Sight and Sound (R. 100:12, 1236-37, 259). Although some of those videos were
possibly screeners, most of the movies pawned were "brand new," with titles including
Jurassic Park, Heat, and Casino, sometimes up to fifteen copies of each (R. 100:99-103).
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Then, on April 10, 1998, defendant was captured on videotape stealing two cases of tapes
from Sight and Sound. As discussed above, see pp. 10-17 supra, the evidence at trial
supported the conclusion that those boxes contained a total of 100 brand new videotapes.
Finally, Sight and Sound official Ross Johnson testified both at trial and during the
restitution hearing, that Sight and Sound paid from about $10 to about $70 for each of its
videos, making the average cost somewhere between $35 and $40 a tape (R. 100:27, 15053; R. 103:4).
This evidence, the trial court's recitation of which at the restitution hearing was
accepted without objection (R. 103:8-9, 16-17, 20, 26), is more than sufficient to support
the trial court's findings that defendant stole a total of 993 videos from Sight and Sound
(the 893 that he pawned and the 100 that he stole on April 10), and that the average cost
of these videos to Sight and Sound was at least $35. Thus, defendant cannot establish
either that "the clear weight of [the] evidence contradicts the trial court's [ruling],"
McBride, 940 P.2d at 541, or that there exists an "evidentiary defect... so obvious and
fundament" that the trial court should have found it sua sponte, Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at
1|18.
Moreover, even if this Court considers defendant's claim that some of the
videotapes he pawned were valueless screeners, the trial court's use of $35 as the average
cost of a video, as opposed to $40 (the higher average figure given by Mr. Johnson), more
than accounted for the valueless screeners.
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Nine hundred ninety-three tapes, at an average cost of $40, are worth a total of
$39,720. Nine hundred ninety-three tapes, at an average cost of $35, are worth a total of
$34,755. By choosing to use the $35 figure over the $40 figure, the trial court lessened
defendant's potential restitution burden by $4965 ($39,720 - $34,755).
Pawn shop owner Mark Reich testified that no more than five percent of the videos
defendant pawned were screeners (R. 100:103). Five percent of 893 tapes is 44.65 or
forty-five tapes. Even if those tapes were subtracted from the 993 total upon which the
trial court calculated restitution, thereby leaving a total number of valuable tapes taken at
948, the total amount of restitution, had the trial court chosen to use the average value of
$40 instead of $35, would have been $37,920—still some $3,000 more that the trial court
actually ordered defendant to pay.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using the figures it did to
calculate the amount of restitution defendant should pay. See State v. Schweitzer, 943
P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1997) (holding appellate court will not disturb trial court's
restitution order "unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or [the trial court] otherwise
abused its discretion").
Finally, even if the trial court did err in calculating restitution, defendant invited
such error by affirmatively adopting the numbers upon which the trial court's calculation
was based. The "invited error" doctrine provides that "a party cannot take advantage of
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an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
Here, defense counsel, in clarifying the trial court's identification of the relevant
videos, referred to uthe 893 that we've already talked about and the 100—the 100 in the
two boxes" (R. 103:9). Later, when the trial court reiterated the number of tapes to which
defendant had been connected, "893, 18 and then two boxes of 50" (R. 103:20), counsel
responded, "Each, right" (R. 103:20).4 Still later, she indicated that "[defendant] did
pawn the 893 tapes, there was the 100, the two—the boxes of 50, the two boxes" (R.
103:26).
Moreover, counsel did not dispute the evidence concerning the average value of
the tapes stolen (R. 103:8-9). Counsel's "only dispute" was, apparently, "what of the 893"
videos pawned were screeners (R. 103:16-17, 20).
To the extent counsel's statements constitute invited error, defendant cannot now
claim plain error on appeal. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284-85 (Utah 1989)
(refusing to reach issue under "invited error" doctrine where defendant was "alleging on
appeal prejudicial error which was affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived at
the sentencing proceeding").

4

The eighteen (18) videos were those new Touch videos found in defendant's
actual possession upon search of his home and storage unit (R. 103:14, 18). Because
those videos were repossessed by Sight and Sound, they were not included in the trial
court's restitution calculation (R. 103:19-20).
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For all of these reasons, defendant's claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions and sentences.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED /^February 2001
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

76-6-412

CRIMINAL CODE

86

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is afirearmor an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if:
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is
less than $5,000;
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery,
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf,
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal
raised for commercial purposes;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less
than $300.
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(bXiii), is civilly
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing —
Definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
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(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (lXe).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4X0 and (4Xd).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Xb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney^ fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
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(0 Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
dii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court orderfromone county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5XcXi) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
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presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
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(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.

